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LEGALLY BLIND: THE THERAPEUTIC ILLUSION 
IN THE SUPPORT STUDY OF EXTREMELY 
PREMATURE INFANTS 
George J. Annas∗ & Catherine L. Annas∗∗ 
“Informed consent . . . is a moral requirement of both respect for autonomy 
and the good of the patient.  It applies equally in the therapeutic and the 
experimental situation, and it is the responsibility of every physician.” 
Edmund D. Pellegrino, MD 1 
Physician-researchers follow a protocol to generate generalizable 
knowledge; physicians have a duty to treat patients in ways they and their 
patients think best.   In both activities, research and treatment, physicians 
often see themselves simply as physicians, practicing medicine.  Sick people 
have similar perception difficulties, and prefer to think of their physician-
researcher simply as their physician, even when their treatment is 
determined by a protocol or the flip of a coin.2  Almost 20 years ago, in this 
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 1. Edmund D. Pellegrino, Autonomy, Beneficence, and Experimental Subject’s 
Consent: A Response to Jay Katz, 38 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 55, 61 (1993). 
 2. Jay Katz, Human Experimentation and Human Rights, 38 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 7, 
16-17 (1993); see also JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 142-
50 (1984). 
2 The Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy Vol. XXX:1 
Journal, one of us suggested that at least some researchers use language “to 
obscure; to blur or eliminate the distinctions between research and therapy, 
scientist and physician, and subject and patient.”3  It was suggested that a 
major reason for the blurring was to “lower the standards for obtaining 
informed consent.”  To prevent this, it was further suggested that it is 
necessary to firmly establish that the modern informed consent doctrine 
applies to both research and treatment.4  In this article we explore the 
recurrent problem of equating research and treatment, and its recurring (but 
misinformed) rationale—that in practice, informed consent only applies to 
research, and not treatment.  Historically, misleading and confusing terms 
such as “therapeutic research,” “experimental treatment,” and “invalidated 
treatment” have been used to blur the distinction between research and 
treatment.  Similar misleading terms are being deployed in an effort to make 
evidence-based medicine research (including comparative-effectiveness 
research) easier to do by dispensing with or watering down disclosure 
requirements.  We agree with the great need to do more research on the 
safety and efficacy of currently used treatments, but strongly disagree that 
such research requires abandoning or diluting informed consent, or treating 
patients simply as passive objects for the valid purpose of improving the 
quality of care for all. 
	  
 3. George J. Annas, Questing for Grails: Duplicity, Betrayal and Self-Deception in 
Postmodern Medical Research, 12 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 297 (1996).  The 
article argued, among other things, that seeing medical experiments as an integral part of 
searching for a “Holy Grail” (of any sort of medical care, such as curing cancer) suggests 
that the results will prove “miraculous,” but also that “blind devotion” to research and 
research protocols “produces uncritical action that can ultimately destroy values essential 
to human dignity.”  Id. at 297. 
 4. Id. at 314-15.  The substance of informed consent is the same in research and 
treatment, but what may be thought of as “procedural aspects” of informed consent vary.  
For example, federal research rules govern certain aspects of informed consent to 
research, including the requirement that it contain all the elements outlined in federal 
regulations, be set forth in a written consent form the research subject must sign, and the 
form itself has to be reviewed and approved by an Institutional Review Board before 
subjects can be recruited for a research project.  Blurring the distinction between research 
and treatment, and following this blurring with a reduced or minimum consent 
requirement is the explicit goal of the “learning health care system ethics framework.”  
Ruth Faden, Nancy Kass, Steven Goodman, Peter Pronovost, Sean Tunis & Tom 
Beauchamp, An Ethics Framework for a Learning Health Care System: A Departure 
from Traditional Research Ethics and Clinical Ethics, 43 HASTINGS CENTER. REP. 1, S16 
(2013).  In the words of the proponents, their learning “framework rejects the moral 
relevance of the traditional distinction between research and practice . . . [and future work 
will develop criteria to determine] which activities require express prospective consent 
and which may be addressed by routine disclosures.”  Id. at S24. 
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The latest term for conflating research and treatment is “standard of care 
research,” and the leading example that illustrates the problems with 
employing new and confusing terms for research is a study on extremely 
premature infants, the “Surfactant, Positive Pressure, and Pulse Oximetry 
Randomized Trial” (known as the SUPPORT study and described below).5  
The (mistaken) belief that clinical practice on children does not require the 
informed consent of the parents explains, we think, why this seductive term, 
standard-of-care research, was invented. It seemed to justify, for example, 
not informing parents of the risks of death in each of the two possible groups 
to which their infant would be randomized in the SUPPORT study.  Viewing 
research as treatment is a common mistake patients also make, so common 
that it has been given a name, the “therapeutic misconception,” or the 
“therapeutic illusion.”6  We will suggest that in the SUPPORT study the 
	  
 5. SUPPORT Study Group of the Eunice Kennedy Shriver NICHD Neonatal 
Research Network, Target Ranges of Oxygen Saturation in Extremely Preterm Infants, 
362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1959 (2010).  The study had been planned in the early 2000s 
because, although the dangers of blindness as a result of giving too much oxygen to 
extremely premature infants was well known, the “lack of definitive evidence” on which 
to base treatment meant that “neonatal care providers differ[ed] widely, with no 
consensus in their policies, practices, and strong beliefs regarding oxygen management in 
both the early and later neonatal courses of premature infants.”  Cynthia H. Cole, 
Kenneth W. Wright, William Tarnow-Mordi & Dale L. Phelps, Resolving our 
Uncertainty about Oxygen Therapy, 112 PEDIATRICS 1415, 1415 (2003) (proposing that 
“an adequately powered, large, randomized, controlled trial” be conducted).  The study 
was proposed “to resolve the uncertainty and determine the impact of different ranges of 
oxygen levels or saturations, initiated early in the neonatal course, on ROP [retinopathy 
of prematurity] and other important outcomes such as mortality . . . .”  Id.  The study was 
to be designed to answer the question of whether using levels in the “lower” versus the 
“higher” range of oxygen saturation could “reduce the incidence of severe ROP without 
increasing important adverse neonatal outcomes.”  Id. at 1416.  The outcomes to be 
measured “include[d] severe ROP, blindness, bronchopulmonary dysplasia, growth, 
death, and different types of major neurodevelopmental or neurosensory impairment 
beyond infancy.”  Id. at 1417.  The authors noted that obtaining equipoise among 
neonatal units would be difficult when comparing 85-89% vs. 91-95% because “some 
neonatal units regard [greater than] 90% as mandatory” even though there is data that 
suggests oxygen can be reduced without increasing “mortality or cerebral palsy.”  Id. 
 6. Annas, supra note 3; see also Jonathan Kimmelman, The Therapeutic 
Misconception at 25: Treatment, Research and Confusion, 37 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 6, 
36 (2007).  It should be noted that the acronym of the study, “SUPPORT,” lends itself to 
the therapeutic misconception, as it suggests therapy (“support”), rather than research. 
See infra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.  This problem is also illustrated by the 
history of phase 1 cancer trials in the U.S.  Sam Horng, Ezekiel Emanuel, Benjamin 
Wilfond, Jonathan Rackoff, Karen Martz & Christine Grady, Descriptions of Benefits and 
Risks in Consent Forms for Phase 1 Oncology Trials, 347 NEW ENG. J. MED. 26, 2134, 
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therapeutic illusion was strongest on the part of the researchers, sponsors, 
Institutional Review Boards (“IRBs”), and institutions, rather than, as is 
usual, on the part of the patient-subjects. 
I. THE SUPPORT STUDY 
The SUPPORT study, conducted by the 23 research hospitals that are part 
of the Neonatal Research Network of the Eunice Kennedy Shriver National 
Institute of Child Health and Human Development, was based on a 2 by 2 
intervention design.  Extremely premature infants (24 weeks, 0 days to 27 
weeks, 6 days gestation) were randomized prior to birth to receive either 
early continuous positive airway pressure (“CPAP”) or early surfactant.  The 
infants in both of these groups were then randomized again to receive 
oxygen saturation targeted at either 85-89% (low range) or 91-95% (high 
range).  Since 1950 it was known that higher ranges of oxygen increased the 
risk of blindness.  The hypothesis for the oxygen saturation component of 
the trial (the one we concentrate on in this article) was that: 
[A] lower target range of oxygen saturation (85 to 89%), as 
compared with a higher ranger (91 to 95%), would reduce the 
incidence of the composite outcome of severe retinopathy of 
prematurity [which causes blindness] or death among infants who 
were born between 24 weeks 0 days of gestation and 27 weeks 6 
days gestation.7 
The hospitals participating in the SUPPORT study enrolled more than 
1,300 infants from 2004 to 2009.  Two aspects of the study became 
particularly controversial, both centered on informed consent: the extent to 
which the parents were adequately informed of the risks to their infants by 
participating in the study, and the extent to which the parents were properly 
informed of how the study would be conducted, especially that the 
instruments used to measure the oxygen saturation levels in their babies 
would be modified so that the readings they gave were inaccurate ones.   
Using the modified pulse oximeters meant  that the team caring for their 
infant would not know the actual oxygen level their infant was getting.  
Specifically, under the protocol, in order to blind the researchers as to which 
oxygen arm the infant was in, the pulse oximeters, which measure the 
oxygen saturation levels in the blood, were altered to give inaccurate 
readings: in one group, the instrument showed saturation levels of 88 to 
92%, even though the actual level was in the 85 to 89% range; and in the 
	  
2134 (2002).  One study of 260 consent forms for phase 1 cancer trails, for example, 
termed the “investigational agent as ‘treatment’ or ‘therapy,’ without including 
modifying words such as ‘experimental’ or ‘research’” 96 percent of the time.  Id. at 
2136. 
 7. SUPPORT, supra note 5, at 1960. 
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other group the instrument showed saturation levels again at 88 to 92%, even 
though the true level in this group was in the 91 to 95% range.  The 
maximum variation was 3%, so that in one arm of the study the true reading 
was 87% when the oximeter read 90%, and in the other arm of the study the 
true reading was 93% when the oximeter read 90%.  Alarms were set to go 
off at the extremes (i.e. at the 85% level and the 95% level) to keep all actual 
levels within the 85-95% range, which was thought to be the range of 
accepted care (or standard care) for extremely premature infants in neonatal 
intensive care units (“NICUs”) around the U.S.8 
On March 7, 2013, the U.S. Office for Human Research Protection 
(“OHRP”), the federal agency within the Department of Health and Human 
Services (“HHS”) charged with overseeing institutions that conduct 
research, including federally-funded research, sent a 12-page letter to the 
University of Alabama at Birmingham (“UAB”) regarding SUPPORT.9  The 
letter summarized the investigation into a complaint that the research was 
not done in compliance with OHRP’s regulations, specifically that the 
consent form did not properly disclose the risks of participating in the study.  
The consent form listed the following: 
Possible Benefits: 
It is possible that using lower pulse oximeter ranges will result in 
fewer babies with severe Retinopathy of Prematurity (ROP). 
Possible Risks: 
	  
 8. Id. at 1960.  It is worth underlining early that, although this research was often 
characterized as “standard of care” research  (comparing two oxygen ranges that were 
within the ranges physicians were using before the study was done), in fact no physician 
in practice was blinding themselves to what the actual oxygen levels were for their tiny 
patients by using a measuring device that was calibrated to give inaccurate readings, and 
few, if any, physicians were maintaining oxygen levels at either extreme of the range, but 
rather were raising or lowering oxygen levels depending on how their patients were doing 
based on  physical assessments and other clinical measurements.  See also Tuyet-Hang 
Nghiem, James I. Hagadorn, Norma Terrin, Sally Syke, Brenda MacKinnon and Cynthia 
H. Cole, Nurse Opinions and Pulse Oximeter Saturation Target Limits for Preterm 
Infants, 121 PEDIATRICS e1039 (2008).  A 2004 survey of neonatal ICUs found 
“acceptable” ranges from 80% to 100%, where “the range of lower limits was 80% to 
92% . . . and the range of upper limits was 92% to 100%.”  Id. at e1041.  It should also be 
noted that, while almost all of the commentary on SUPPORT has involved the ethics of 
consent, the design of the trial itself has also been questioned—although this issue is 
beyond the scope of this article.  See, e.g., infra notes 54 and 55, and accompanying text. 
 9. Letter from Lisa R. Buchanan, Compliance Oversight Coordinator, OHRP Div. 
of Compliance Oversight, to Richard B. Marchase, Vice President for Research & 
Economic Development, UAB (Mar. 7, 2013), 
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/detrm_letrs/YR13/mar13a.pdf. 
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There is no known risk to your baby from monitoring with the 
pulse oximeters used for this study. The possible risk of skin 
breakdown at the site will be minimized by your baby’s nurse 
moving the oximeter to another arm or leg a couple of times a 
day.10 
OHRP found that these descriptions “failed to include or adequately 
address” the requirement that: “A description of any reasonably foreseeable 
risks and discomforts” be included as required by federal regulation 
46.116(a)(2).11  OHRP concluded that while each of the two groups in the 
study was within the 85-95% range of standard of care oxygen levels, the 
higher range (91-95%) and the lower range (85-89%) each differed from the 
usual standard of care.12  Moreover, OHRP found that the purpose of the 
study itself was to determine  if one of the two ranges was superior in terms 
not only of ROP, but also “neurological development and possibly death.”13  
On this basis, OHRP required UAB to “provide a plan that the IRB will use 
to ensure that approved informed consent documents include and adequately 
address the basic elements of consent as required by HHS regulations 45 
CFR 46.116(a).”14  In a letter of its own, UAB quickly (and reasonably) 
responded that it had “revised the sample consent form provided to 
	  
 10. UAB CONSENT FORM FOR SUPPORT IN EXTREMELY LOW BIRTH WEIGHT 
INFANTS 3-4 (Oct. 1, 2004), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/support-
study-consent-form.pdf [hereinafter UAB CONSENT FORM].  There were 23 different 
consent forms, one for each center, and they had variations.  All forms are available at 
Public Citizen’s website: http://www.citizen.org/hrg2124.  The OHRP action related to 
the consent form used by the University of Alabama at Birmingham.  The “sample 
consent form” for the SUPPORT study was developed by the University of California, 
San Diego.  That form stated flatly regarding risks: “Because all of the treatments 
proposed in this study are standard of care, there is no predictable increase in risk for 
your baby. . . .  [E]ach of the 4 possible combinations of treatments is considered by 
some units to represent their desired approach.” UNIV. OF CAL., SAN DIEGO, SUPPORT 
MANUAL OF OPERATIONS APPENDIX B: SAMPLE CONSENT FORM, NAT’L INST. FOR CHILD 
& HUMAN DEV., at B-1 (Jan. 4, 2005), 
http://www.nichd.nih.gov/about/Documents/Consent_Form_Template.pdf [hereinafter 
SAMPLE CONSENT FORM].  If you read all of the consent forms together you would get the 
impression that the most important legal issue in the SUPPORT study was privacy of 
medical records, and the second most important issue was who was going to pay for the 
neonatal care of the infant, and any adverse consequences to the infant that required 
additional care.  Informed consent, even in the consent form, seemed to be treated much 
less seriously than these two issues. 
 11. Buchanan, supra note 9, at 9. 
 12. Id. at 9-10. 
 13. Id. at 9. 
 14. Id. at 11.  
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investigators . . . [adding] to the Risks and Discomforts section to instruct 
investigators to include the specific risks of all arms even if those procedures 
fall within the parameters of standard of care.”15  Checklists of institutional 
requirements had also been “refined to ensure inclusion of all of the basic 
elements of consent,” and staff members responsible “ha[d] been reminded 
that the risks of all study arms must be described in the consent document, 
even when those arms fall within the parameters of standard of care.”16 
Shortly thereafter, the Health Research Group of Public Citizen was asked 
to investigate the matter further, presumably (but we don’t know) by the 
same person or persons who filed the original complaint with OHRP.  On 
the basis of their own review, Public Citizen wrote a letter to the Secretary 
of HHS expressing “serious concern regarding the grossly inadequate 
corrective actions” OHRP required.17 After outlining its own concerns with 
the consent form, and the lack of action by any of the 23 IRBs in the 
SUPPORT study, Public Citizen concluded that “the egregious deficiencies 
in the informed-consent process alone resulted in indefensible, highly 
unethical research involving vulnerable premature infants.”18  Public Citizen 
asked the Secretary to direct OHRP “to expand its compliance-oversight 
investigation of SUPPORT” to include the “ethics of the study design” and 
asked her to issue “a formal apology” to the parents of all 1,316 subjects 
enrolled in SUPPORT.19  Public Citizen also asked the Secretary to initiate 
an “independent investigation of the HHS system for review and oversight 
of HHS-funded human subjects research to understand how the system 
failed so miserably in the case of the SUPPORT study.”20 
Initial reactions to Public Citizen’s complaint varied widely, from 
describing SUPPORT as grossly “unethical,” and the failure to obtain 
informed consent as “startling and deplorable,” to attacks on OHRP itself as 
uninformed and off the mark.21  The major argument for not disclosing the 
	  
 15. Response Letter from Richard B. Marchase, Vice President for Economic 
Development, UAB to OHRP, at 1 (Mar. 22, 2013) (copy on file with authors and with 
the Journal). 
 16. Id. at 1-2. 
 17. Letter from Michael A. Carome, Deputy Dir. for Public Citizen’s Health 
Research Group, to HHS Sec’y Kathleen Sebelius 1 (Apr. 9, 2013), 
http://www.citizen.org/documents/2111.pdf. 
 18. Id. at 11 (emphasis added). 
 19. Id. at 11. 
 20. Id. at 12; see also infra, note 45 and accompanying text. 
 21. See e.g., Editorial, An Ethical Breakdown, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2013) (“23 
academic institutions authorized a research project that failed to meet the most basic 
standard: providing an informed consent document to parents that accurately described 
the risks and benefits of the research to be conducted on extremely premature babies.  
This failure was startling, and deplorable.”). 
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risks of death and blindness in each arm of the study was that because the 
oxygen levels used in both arms of the study were within the wide range of 
oxygen levels currently in use, each arm could be characterized as “standard 
of care.” Because extremely premature infants could have gotten either high 
or low oxygen ranges in the non-research, therapeutic setting with their own 
physicians, the infants, it was argued,  experienced no additional risk by 
being randomized to one or the other arm of the study.22 
In early April the New York Times ran a front-page article under the 
headline “Study of Babies Did Not Disclose Risks, U.S. Finds.”23  In the 
story Richard B. Marchase, vice president for research at the University of 
Alabama at Birmingham, was quoted as saying that he had already assured 
OHRP that in the future “we will to the best of our ability let the subjects or 
their parents know as thoroughly as possible what previous studies suggest 
in terms of risk,” adding, “[w]e are going to be very sensitive to that going 
forward as we look at these consent forms.”24  An article the next day in the 
Washington Post quoted a neonatologist at the University of California at 
San Diego as saying “I don’t have any regrets.  Everybody went into this 
with their best intention.  Nobody was trying to deceive anybody.”25  In the 
Post article Marchase added, “[b]ecause all the infants were being treated 
within the standard of care, investigators agreed that the extent to which 
risks and benefits were delineated in the consent form was appropriate.”26 
	  
 22. Echoing the San Diego consent form, SAMPLE CONSENT FORM, supra note 10, the 
form reads: “Because all of the treatments proposed in this study are standard of care, 
there is no predictable increase in risk for your baby.” 
 23. Sabrina Tavernise, Study of Babies Did Not Disclose Risks, U.S. Finds, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 11, 2013, at A1. 
 24. Id. 
 25. David Brown, Federal Agency Faults Ethics of Infant Study, WASH. POST, Apr. 
11, 2013, at A1, available at http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-04-
10/national/38436030_1_premature-babies-human-research-protections-blindness.  San 
Diego researchers drafted the “sample consent form” for SUPPORT.  See SAMPLE 
CONSENT FORM, supra note 10. 
 26. Brown, supra note 25 (emphasis added).  Shortly thereafter, on April 17, 2013, a 
class action lawsuit was filed against the Director, Chair, and individual members of the 
IRB of the University of Alabama, as well as the SUPPORT researchers, alleging, among 
other things, that named infants in the study “have suffered permanent neurological and 
vision issues” because of the study’s unethical design and the failure of the consent 
document to disclose the risks “with respect to which arm of the study their infants were 
randomized into.”  Looney v. Moore, No. 2:13-CV-00733, WL 1910388, ¶ 6, ¶ 9 (N. D. 
Ala. filed Apr. 17, 2013).  Concern about potential liability from suits like this one is 
likely to have influenced at least some of the commentators who have spoken and written 
about the ethics of the SUPPORT study.  Proving that either the study design or the 
deficiencies in consent caused injury to any particular newborn is the major hurdle in this 
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After the SUPPORT study had been published in the New England 
Journal of Medicine, Editor-in-Chief Dr. Jeffrey Drazen quickly coauthored 
a strong editorial in favor of conducting research with extremely premature 
infants in general, and defended the SUPPORT study specifically.27  He and 
his coauthors expressed disappointment in OHRP’s conclusion that the risks 
to the neonates had not been stated in the consent form, stating that the 
finding: 
[D]oes not take into account either the extent of clinical equipoise 
at the time the study was initiated and conducted or that the 
consent form, viewed in its entirety, addressed the prevalent 
knowledge fairly and reasonably.  At the time . . . there was no 
evidence to suggest an increased risk of death with oxygen levels 
in the lower end of a range viewed by experts as acceptable . . . [(a 
risk] later uncovered by the trial itself).28 
Dr. Drazen’s editorial concluded that OHRP’s investigation: 
[H]as had the effect of damaging the reputation of investigators 
and, even worse, casting a pall over the conduct of clinical 
research to answer important questions in daily practice. . . .We 
are dismayed by the response of the OHRP and consider the 
SUPPORT trial a model of how to make medical progress.29 
The same issue of the Journal also contained a Perspectives piece by two 
bioethicists, David Magnus and Arthur Caplan,30 and a letter from the 
SUPPORT researchers defending their consent form: 
Our consent forms were conscientiously drafted according to the 
Code of Federal Regulations and were based on the best available 
evidence.  We provided parents with the information known at the 
time, which did not indicate an increased risk of death resulting 
from assignment to either treatment group.  We have adhered to 
	  
lawsuit.  An alternative theory for failure to obtain informed consent is that this is a 
dignitary harm that warrants compensation.  See, e.g., Peter Aronson, A Medical 
Indignity, NAT’L L. J., Mar. 27, 2000, at A1, A8 (discussing a $3.8 million settlement in a 
case in which mostly indigent and non-English speaking pregnant women were recruited 
into a research trial involving multiple amniocenteses without their informed consent). 
 27. Jeffrey M. Drazen, Caren G. Solomon & Michael F. Greene, Informed Consent 
and SUPPORT, 368 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1929-31 (2013). 
 28. Id. at 1930. 
 29. Id. 
 30. David Magnus & Arthur Caplan, Risk, Consent, and SUPPORT, 368 NEW ENG. 
J. MED. 1864-65 (2013). See also David Magnus, The SUPPORT Controversy and the 
Debate over Research within the Standard of Care, 13 AM. J. BIOETHICS 1 (2013) 
(introduction to a special issue of the American Journal of Bioethics on the “SUPPORT 
controversy.”) 
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the highest ethical principles, and we will continue to work to 
ensure that known potential risks are described in our consent 
forms.31 
Magnus and Caplan characterized OHRP’s insistence on including the 
risk of death in the consent form as factually wrong: “asking that research be 
described as riskier than it really is and . . . suggesting that the parents were 
	  
 31. Waldemar A. Carlo, et al. Oxygen Saturation Targets in Extremely Preterm 
Infants, 368 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1949, 1950 (2013) (emphasis added) (“The infants in 
both treatment groups had lower rates of death before discharge (16.2% in the higher-
oxygen-saturation group and 19.9% in the lower-oxygen-saturation group) than did those 
who were not enrolled (24.1%) and historical controls (23.1%), and rates of blindness did 
not differ between the treatment groups. . . . Ill-informed allegations create unwarranted 
apprehension that serves no one. . . . We thank the families of our patients for their trust 
in us; we will continually strive to maintain that trust.”).  The editors of Nature responded 
directly to this argument in an August 21, 2013 editorial: “And although it is true that, 
collectively, the infants enrolled in the study may have been at no greater risk of a 
negative outcome than infants who were not enrolled, it is not collectives who sign 
informed consent documents.  It is individuals.”  Editorial, Subject to Question: Even 
When Conducting Clinical Trials to Study Widely Used Therapies, Researchers Must 
Ensure That They Disclose the Full Risks to Patients, 500 NATURE 377, 377 (Aug. 21, 
2013).  It should also be noted that the article the SUPPORT researchers relied on for 
their assertion that the infants in the SUPPORT study had lower death rates than those 
eligible but not enrolled found that the two groups (those in SUPPORT and those not 
enrolled) were not comparable because the unenrolled had an “increased frequency of 
delivery room interventions and poor Apgar scores . . . [indicating that] SUPPORT 
infants were less disadvantaged than the overall eligible population.” Wade Rich, Neil N. 
Finer, Marie G. Gantz, et al., Enrollment of Extremely Low Birth Weight Infants in a 
Clinical Research Study May Not Be Representative, 129 PEDIATRICS 480, 482 (2012). 
The authors concluded not that SUPPORT was a better intervention than standard of care, 
but rather that “the birth characteristics . . . were likely responsible for the improved 
outcomes of enrolled infants.”  Id.  The real target of the article, however, was informed 
consent itself.  The authors argued that because the excluded patients were different from 
the enrolled patients, “the constraints of preintervention informed consent creates a 
situation where population bias is a significant issue.”  Id.  Because of the bias in the 
SUPPORT study subject, the authors argued that a way should be found to eliminate pre-
enrollment consent, writing: “A waiver or delay of parental consent should be considered 
to promote the generalizability of minimal-risk trials of interventions in the delivery room 
or shortly after birth.  Additional research and regulatory review need to be carried out to 
ensure that large moderate-risk trials that currently require antenatal consent can be 
conducted in such a way as to ensure the generalizability of results.”  Id. at 483.  The 
take-home messages from this article should not be missed: (1) SUPPORT, although a 
“gold standard” blinded randomized clinical trial was biased by its enrollment procedures 
so the results are not generalizable; and (2) the blame for bias should be placed on the 
informed consent procedures adopted by SUPPORT(!). 
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duped into enrolling their frail infants in dangerous research.”32 They 
rejected OHRP’s conclusion because they believe that both arms of the 
SUPPORT study can be characterized as “standard treatment” (and thus did 
not increase risk of death or blindness to the infant).  In any event, they 
continued, death is a well-understood risk with premature infants: all this is 
“taking place in a clinical context in which parents understand that the 
standard treatments may be unsuccessful and that there is a grave risk of 
death.”33 
The Director of the National Institutes of Health  
(“NIH”), Francis Collins, and coauthors also defended the SUPPORT study 
in the Journal with a short piece entitled “In Support of SUPPORT.”  
Collins rejected the suggestion that either arm of the SUPPORT study could 
objectively be thought to create an increased risk of death, writing: 
The more recent studies [after 2000] showed no increased risk of 
death or neurodevelopment impairment at saturation levels as low 
as 70%. Given these data, the investigators had no reason to 
foresee that infants in one study group would have a higher risk of 
death than would those in the other group . . . The increased risk of 
death was a significant and unexpected finding of the study; if it 
had been known before the study began, standard clinical care 
would not have encompassed the lower oxygen range, and it would 
have been unethical to conduct the study.34 
The writers noted that the controversy “has alarmed some of the parents of 
infants who were in the study, confused the biomedical research community, 
and befuddled IRBs.”35  Because of this alarm, the NIH writers announced 
that HHS had decided to engage in a “national dialogue with the research, 
advocacy, and ethics communities on how best to respect and protect 
participants in research studies conducted within the standard of care and 
how to define ‘reasonably foreseeable risks’ in this setting.”36  Actions 
included putting the compliance action against the University of Alabama on 
hold, and conducting a public hearing on “standard of care research” with 
the goal of producing “appropriate guidance” on this subject.37 
	  
 32. Magnus & Caplan, supra note 30 at 1865. 
 33. Id. (emphasis added). 
 34. Kathy Hudson, Alan Guttmacher & Francis Collins, In Support of SUPPORT: A 
View from the NIH, 368 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2349, 2349-51 (2013) (emphasis added). 
 35. Id. at 2351. 
 36. Id.  
 37. Id.  
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A. Dueling Ethicists 
The consent dispute engaged two conflicting groups of bioethicists, each 
of which published their opinions in the New England Journal of 
Medicine.38  Supporters of the SUPPORT study published first.  Benjamin 
Wilfond and colleagues urged OHRP to withdraw its risk of death finding 
because, they argued, OHRP’s conclusion that either of the two arms of 
SUPPORT’s “routinely used oxygen-saturation levels exposed subjects to 
additional risk (above the risks of routine clinical treatment) is not supported 
by the evidence . . . [and] is without substantive merit and overreaches.”39  
Their primary concern was not for the research subjects or their parents, but 
for the researchers and their institutions: “Allowing the decision to stand 
would be unfair to the investigators and institutions involved in 
SUPPORT.”40  On the other hand, they did acknowledge that “the 
permission [sic] forms could have been improved,” and that “the consent 
process for clinical research can no doubt be improved.”41 
In response, a competing group of bioethicists and physicians wrote in 
support of OHRP’s risk determination, which they described as “justified,” 
and not an “overreach.”42  Ruth Macklin and colleagues argued that no 
matter how important the study, “the consent process must be clear enough 
to enable informed decision making.”43  The signatories found the consent 
forms seriously deficient because: none of them “specifically mentioned 
death as a possible risk of the oxygen interventions in the study;” they 
lacked an adequate description of alternatives; they did not describe the use 
of modified oximeters; and they did not explain the differences between the 
research and clinical care.44  The group also rejected the argument that, 
	  
 38. Benjamin S. Wilfond et al., The OHRP and SUPPORT, 368 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
e36 (2013); Ruth Macklin et al., The OHRP and SUPPORT: Another View, 369 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. e3 (2013) 
 39. Wilfond et al., supra note 38. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. (“Although we acknowledge that the permission forms [sic] could have been 
improved, we disagree that the random assignment of infants to a high oxygen-saturation 
level or a low oxygen-saturation level imposed additional risks that the investigators 
failed to disclose.”). 
 42. Macklin et al., supra note 38 (responding ethicists’ letter signed by physicians, 
bioethicists, lawyers, and scholars in allied fields). See also Ruth Macklin & Lois 
Shepherd, Informed Consent and Standard of Care:  What Must be Disclosed, 13 AM. J. 
BIOETHICS 9, 13 (2013) (“Researchers are of course well intentioned…But it is the 
doctors, and not the researchers, who have a fiduciary obligation and long-standing ethic 
to pursue the patient’s best interests above all other considerations.”).   
 43. Macklin et al., supra note 38.  
 44. Id. 
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because both arms of the study were within the “standard of care,” there was 
no additional risk to the subjects: 
The potential risks and benefits of being in the study could not be 
said to be the same as the potential risks and benefits of receiving 
care outside the study, in settings in which infants were not 
randomly assigned and held to oxygen levels at either end of a 
wide range of oxygen-saturation levels generally considered to be 
safe.  Nor could the risks and benefits be said to be the same in the 
two groups of the study.  Of course, the outcomes were not known 
ahead of time, but a potential differential in the risks that were 
being tracked (death, retinopathy of prematurity, and neurologic 
impairment) was reasonably foreseeable, since determining 
differential risk was the very purpose of the study.45 
In a separate analysis published in the British Medical Journal, 
bioethicists Jon Merz and Nancy King noted that in the design of the study, 
the primary outcome across the two arms “was comparison of death or 
retinopathy of prematurity” (“ROP”).46  But, they argued, while combining 
these two outcomes into one may help arrive at a statistically significant 
finding, it comingles two outcomes that are not comparable.47  In their 
words, “death is a much, much more serious outcome than ROP.  Indeed, 
many parents may simply be unwilling to take any increased chance of death 
just to avoid ROP—another reason the tradeoff should have been disclosed 
to parents.”48 
B. The Public Meeting 
The public meeting on SUPPORT and OHRP’s compliance action was 
held on August 28, 2013, and was attended by more than 200 people.49  The 
written presentations are available on the HHS website, the oral 
presentations are all posted on YouTube, and a transcript of the remarks is 
	  
 45. Id. (emphasis added). 
 46. Jon Merz, Nancy King, Re: US Study Criticized for Experimentation with 
Premature Infants, 347 BMJ f4198 (2013) available at 
http://www.bmj.com/content/347/bmj.f4198/rr/653401. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. U.S. Department  of Health & Human Services OHRP Public Meeting on 
Matters Related to Protection of Human Subjects and Research Considering Standard of 
Care Interventions (Aug. 28, 2013), video recording available at 
http://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLrl7E8KABz1Gc_ndt9grGg8O_jE5G1RNC, and 
transcript available at 
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/newsroom/rfc/Public%20Meeting%20August%2028,%202013/
supportmeetingtranscriptfinal.html [hereinafter OHRP Public Meeting].  
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available.50  Many who had previously written on the dispute spoke, 
including Drs. Michael Carome and Sidney Wolfe of Public Citizen, and 
New England Journal of Medicine Editor-in-Chief Dr. Jeffrey Drazen. The 
panel which presided over the hearing, and asked questions, was composed 
of representatives of three agencies within the HHS: OHRP (represented by 
its Director, Jeffrey Minikoff), the NIH (represented by Kathy Hudson, 
Deputy Director for Science Outreach and Policy) and the Food and Drug 
Administration (“FDA”, represented by Robert Temple, Deputy Center 
Director for Clinical Science, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research).51  
The hearing can be fairly characterized, we think, as mostly 
noncontroversial in that most speakers made points that either were not in 
dispute, or that were irrelevant to the controversy over the quality and 
content of the SUPPORT study’s consent forms.  No one, for example, 
contended that comparative effectiveness research should be abandoned, or 
that all clinical care should be characterized as research, or that the 
distinction between clinical care and research should be abolished (although 
some speakers did contend that almost all of what physicians do is not 
evidence-based, and that physicians really do routinely make many 
“random” treatment decisions).52 
	  
 50. Id.  
 51. Id.  
 52. Chris Feudtner, Mark Schreiner & John D. Lantos, Risks (and Benefits) in 
Comparative Effectiveness Research Trials, 369 NEW ENG. J.  MED. 892-94 (2013); 
David Magnus, Comments at the OHRP Public Meeting (Aug. 28, 2013).  This view has 
some support in the bioethics literature.  See, e.g., Samuel Gorovitz & Alasdair 
Macintyre, Toward a Theory of Medical Fallibility, HASTINGS CENTER REP., 13, 20 
(1975) (“every therapeutic intervention is an experiment in regard to the well-being of 
that particular patient.”), and A.C. Ivy, The History and Ethics of the Use of Human 
Subjects in Medical Experiments, 108 SCIENCE 1 (1948) (“we frequently forget to recall 
the fact that a patient is a voluntary experimental subject of the physician.  The physician 
practices medicine today, and because the response of different patients to the same 
therapy will always vary to some extent, the physicians will always practice medicine on 
his patient.” [emphasis in original]).  Both of these comments illustrate the inherent 
tension between the value of generalizable medical/scientific knowledge, and the fact that 
each patient is an individual who may not react like the “average” patient to any given 
intervention.  That the patient, and the subject, are unique individuals with their own 
values and interests is, of course, the primary reason physicians and researchers alike are 
obligated to obtain their informed consent before treating them or conducting research on 
them. These views are well-summarized by Jay Katz in a 1993 article: “Physician-
investigators have long maintained that clinical research and therapy, more often than 
not, are indistinguishable; that the drugs or therapies they subject to scientific study 
frequently are, or could be, proffered to patients in therapeutic settings; and that the only 
difference between their scientific endeavors and clinical practice resides in the objective 
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A few, including the Association of American Medical Colleges, argued 
that the sky really was falling, and that the reaction to SUPPORT would lead 
physicians to abandon research altogether if they had to disclose the risks of 
standard of care treatments to patients.  In their words: 
Even the most dedicated physician scientist may think twice 
before heading into the debris left by the public condemnation of 
the SUPPORT study, which called into question the ethics of the 
government and the investigators.  In the end, that hesitation could 
bring comparative effectiveness research to a grinding halt, 
leaving physicians in the untenable position of taking a reasonable 
guess, instead of ensuring that all patients receive treatment based 
on the best possible evidence.53 
This is an overreaction because the OHRP letter did not call “into question 
the ethics of the government and the investigators” at all.54  The letter was 
addressed to an institutional official, and noted deficiencies in the consent 
form approved by the IRB that was under the official’s jurisdiction.  The 
exclusive target of OHRP was the institution’s failure to write a complete 
consent form for SUPPORT.  This failure does, however, suggest, as Public 
Citizen noted in its own letter, that a central issue that remains to be 
addressed is how 23 IRBs could have done such a poor job in reviewing and 
approving the deficient consent forms for the SUPPORT study.  Nonetheless 
this issue got almost no comments at the public meeting.55 
	  
evaluation of efficacy and risk-benefits to which they submit their interventions.  Thus, 
since vast uncertainties and ignorance about effectiveness and risk-benefits are ubiquitous 
in the practice of medicine, every medical intervention, therapeutic or investigative in 
intent, constitutes an experiment.  Moreover, investigators are apt to argue that in clinical 
practice patients are exposed to unnecessary, scientifically unproven, ineffective, and at 
times dangerous therapies . . . clinical research is an enterprise more moral than clinical 
practice because ultimately it will safeguard patients and future patients from the slings 
and arrows of useless, if not dangerous, therapies.”  Katz, Human Experimentation, supra 
note 2, at 12-13. 
 53. Ann C. Bonham on behalf of Association of American Medical Colleges, 
Comments at OHRP Public Meeting, supra note 49 (emphasis added).  
 54. Id. 
 55. Id.  The performance of the 23 IRBs which all approved deficient consent forms 
for SUPPORT merits further study which would require the IRBs releasing the minutes 
of the meetings at which the decision to approve a SUPPORT consent form was made.  
To our knowledge, no IRB involved in SUPPORT has released this information.  The 
lawsuit is also against the University of Alabama IRB and its members, not against any 
SUPPORT investigators.  Looney v. Moore, No. 2:13-CV-00733, WL 1910388, ¶ 6, ¶ 9 
(N. D. Ala. filed Apr. 17, 2013); see also, Alexander Capron, An Egg Takes Flight: The 
Once and Future Life of the National Bioethics Advisory Commission, 7 KENNEDY INST. 
ETHICS J. 1, 63, 69 (1997) (“[i]f consent forms and study design in research projects at the 
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The hearing did, however, underline three points that had not previously 
been emphasized  which should help HHS officials provide institutions and 
IRBs with additional guidance going forward: (1) Studies that examine 
“titrated”  treatments by comparing extremes of existing treatment levels are 
unlikely to provide any clinically useful information unless they have a 
control group that represents actual practice (aka “standard of care”); (2) 
SUPPORT researchers who were experienced neonatologists had to know 
prior to beginning enrollment in the SUPPORT study that a reasonable risk 
of being in the lower range of oxygen was an increased risk of death; and (3) 
At least some parents  agreed to participate in the SUPPORT study because 
they did not understand the study, its risks, or that they would not have a 
physician making decisions based on their best medical judgment.56 
The first point, that determining what titrated treatment is best by 
comparing the extremes of currently used treatment (here, the oxygen 
levels), is unlikely to provide clinically useful information unless a control 
group is included in the design.  This point was well explained by  two 
clinicians at the National Institutes of Health, Drs. Charles Natanson and 
Robert Danner.  Natanson went even further, under questioning from 
Temple, describing studies of extremes as “physiology experiments,” and 
not legitimate human experiments.  In his view, they have no real hypothesis 
and thus don’t qualify as experiments  (the notion that one extreme is likely 
to have different clinical outcomes than the other extreme is, he implied, 
both obvious and unhelpful, since no one is likely to be treating exclusively 
at either extreme in the real world of clinical medicine).57  In this regard, 
Natanson and Danner raised the bar to include not just informed consent, but 
whether the design of the study itself meant that the risks to the subjects 
could not be outweighed by the potential benefits of the research.  If so, of 
course, the research simply could not be done on human beings, informed 
consent being a necessary but not sufficient justification for research on 
humans.58 
	  
elite institutions that conduct such cutting edge experiments [like recombinant DNA 
experiments] get approved despite their manifest problems, then what confidence can one 
have in the adequacy of the review provided for garden-variety studies conducted at less 
prestigious institutions?”). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Charles Natanson, Comments at OHRP Public Meeting, supra note 49.  
 58. Id.; Robert Danner, Comments at OHRP Public Meeting, supra note 49. See also 
Katherine J. Deans, Peter C. Minneci, Peter Q. Eichacker & Charles Natanson, Defining 
The Standard Of Care in Randomized Controlled Trials of Titrated Therapies, 10 
CURRENT OP. CRITICAL CARE 579-582 (2004); Charles Natanson, Katherine J. Deans, et 
al., Randomization in Clinical Trials of Titrated Therapies: Unintended Consequences of 
Using Fixed Treatment Protocols, 35 CRITICAL CARE MED. 1509-16 (2007). 
2013] Legally Blind: The Therapeutic Illusion in the SUPPORT Study 17 
The second point was made by the only SUPPORT researcher who 
appeared at the hearing, Dr. Jon Tyson.59  Tyson repeated the position of 
some of the SUPPORT study researchers that the reason they did not 
disclose the possibility of an increased risk of death at the lower level arm of 
the study was that “based on the best available evidence, the investigators in 
the trial did not believe that mortality would be increased with reduced or 
lower saturation levels.”60  He was pressed on this issue by Temple, who 
said, among other things, that he found it difficult to accept that no one 
worried “even a little bit” about the lower oxygen levels, noting that 
“everything has a dose-response” and wondering why there would be no 
concern here.61  Tyson responded that they were at equipoise and that 
observational data had shown levels as low as 70% were “safe.”62  He also 
said that he thought lower levels (85-89%, which he had used in his own 
practice) would be safe if we could better “adjust the FiO2 to the baby’s 
needs,” and had “better staffing” in the NICUs to respond quickly when 
levels got too low.63  Temple responded by saying he understood that the 
researchers didn’t think the lower levels increased mortality.  Tyson replied, 
in frustration, that if the study had come out the other way (with mortality 
increased at the higher levels), Temple (and others) would be criticizing the 
researchers for not disclosing that risk of death, based on the data obtained 
from the trial itself.64  Temple responded, no, that he was just saying that “in 
areas of uncertainty, maybe [you owe] patients some explication of what the 
uncertainties are.”65 
Two parents, who had agreed to have their newborns enrolled in 
SUPPORT, spoke about what they understood about the study.  Shawn 
Pratt’s daughter, Dagen, who is now 6 years old, was born at 25 weeks, and 
has cerebral palsy.66  He said they had been asked  to be in many studies, 
and generally consented to be in those that involved observation, medical 
record review, and even blood examinations.  They had, however, refused to 
be involved in an acid reflux study because of the risks.  As to SUPPORT, 
Pratt said it “looked good on paper” and that they did not understand that 
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 62. Jon Tyson, Comments at OHRP Public Meeting, supra note 49.  
 63. Id.  
 64. Id. 
 65. Robert Temple, Comments at OHRP Public Meeting, supra note 49.  
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there would be any risks to his daughter from being in the study, and that the 
“risks and intent of the study were not clear.”67  He ended by saying, “[t]ell 
me that the SUPPORT Study did not hurt Dagen [his daughter] any way.”  
He asked, “would you place your own medically fragile premature child into 
the SUPPORT study?”68  Under questioning, his wife noted that this was a 
particularly vulnerable time for the parents  and that more needs to be done 
to make sure the parents understand what is being asked of them and their 
child.69 
Sharissa Cook’s son, Dreshan Collins, was born at 25 weeks.70  She said 
that there was a general lack of information, that she now feels she was 
“taken advantage of and I feel responsible for my child’s participation in this 
study.”71  She said she did not understand the study at all, and thought it was 
designed to give her and her son “support” in this very difficult time. 
Temple asked her directly if she knew at the time that she was being asked 
to put her son in an experiment, to which she replied:   
No sir.  I was under the impression that this was more of a support 
group, I guess I should say, where they would be holding our hand 
throughout the process to let us know if there were any types of 
delays or anything that we could do since they were premature 
babies. You know, it was my first child. So I was under the 
impression that this was more of more support and this is 
something that could be beneficial to me as well as my son, 
because we have someone there to help us along the way.72 
It is extremely unlikely that these were the only parents of the 1,300 who 
enrolled their newborns in the study that did not understand the SUPPORT 
study when they agreed to put their children in it.  Merely changing one line 
in a complicated consent form is not likely to have made much difference.  
As Ms. Cook put it, parents are very vulnerable when they have an 
extremely premature infant, and actually need real support.  Of course, 
informed consent is a process, not a form (and it is a noun, not a verb).  Is it 
possible to make the informed consent process for research on extremely 
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premature infants better?  The editors of perhaps the leading general science 
journal in the world, Nature, usefully asked readers to put themselves in the 
position of parents asked to enroll their newborn child in SUPPORT in 
words we agree with, and believe most physician-researchers agree with as 
well: 
Put yourself in the position of a parent with an extremely 
premature infant. Would you make the decision to enroll your 
child in the trial if the consent form stated in simple language that 
babies assigned to one group were more likely to go blind, and that 
those in the other group were at higher risk of getting 
neurodevelopmental disabilities? Equally, would you decide to 
enroll if the form spelled out that, if you do not take part, your 
own physician and institution might keep your infant in the middle 
of the range, trying to avoid either outcome?  Perhaps you might, 
but you would do so with full knowledge of the attendant risks. 
The parents in this case could not do so. . . . No matter the 
thorniness of the issues raised [at the OHRP Public Hearing] 
research is still research in whatever context, and the duty to 
protect human subjects must remain paramount.73 
What can be done to better protect extremely premature infants and their 
parents is, as the Nature editors concede, a “thorny” issue?74  The most 
important step, we think, is to take informed consent seriously—in both the 
research and treatment contexts—and to understand that having a personal 
physician whose primary interest is your child’s welfare (rather than 
following a research protocol) is extraordinarily important to most sick 
people, and most parents of sick infants. 
C. Informed Consent and “Standard of Care” Treatment 
There really is only one argument put forward for not telling parents about 
the potential risk of death from volunteering their extremely premature baby 
to the SUPPORT study: both arms of the study were within the range of 
oxygen saturation used in clinical medicine at some hospitals, so they could 
both be seen as “standard of care” (somewhere), and thus being randomly 
assigned to one or the other arm did not increase the risk of death to the 
baby.  This argument cannot be taken seriously for a number of reasons.  
First, as already suggested, there really is a difference between research and 
treatment, and the phrase “standard of care research” is an oxymoron that, 
much like “therapeutic research,” seems to be designed and used primarily 
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to blur and confuse the differences between research and treatment.  The 
primary difference is that in treatment a patient has a physician who is bound 
by a fiduciary duty to act in the patient’s best interests (of course, with the 
patient’s consent).  In contrast, in research the researcher is duty-bound to 
follow the research protocol and may not deviate from it, even if the 
researcher believes a deviation is in the best medical interest of the subject 
(of course, if the subject is in danger, the researcher has an obligation to end 
the subject’s participation in the research).  Second, following standard of 
care does not eliminate the legal requirement to obtain informed consent.  
Informed consent is required for both research and treatment.  Third, 
“standard of care” has a variety of meanings that make its use in the research 
context confusing and counterproductive.  And, finally, no one was actually 
using either of the SUPPORT study’s two arms in clinical practice—as few, 
if any, physicians were practicing exclusively at either extreme of the 
current-practice clinical range, and none were using a pulse oximeter that 
gave inaccurate readings, or ignoring clinical signs that would cause 
“standard of care” providers to change the oxygen saturation levels in their 
newborn patients. 
Standard of care is a concept most often seen in medical malpractice cases 
in which the plaintiff has the burden of proof.75  Specifically, the plaintiff 
must prove that the defendant physician did not act in accordance with what 
a “reasonably prudent physician would do in the same or similar 
circumstances.”  This is simply a definition of the legal duty of a physician, 
i.e. to act in a manner consistent with the medical standard of care. Two 
points should be obvious.  First, as a series of courts have ruled, the standard 
of care takes informed consent for granted as a legal requirement, regardless 
of what physicians usually or “customarily” do.  Physicians have a legal 
duty to obtain voluntary, competent, informed and understanding consent 
before doing any procedure on a patient that has material risks.  As the 
California Supreme Court put it in 1972 in Cobbs v. Grant, physicians are 
obligated by law, because of the fiduciary nature of the doctor-patient 
relationship, to disclose all material risks of a proposed therapy.76  
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“Material” risks always include death and permanent disability, but also 
include any risks that might lead a reasonable patient to refuse the proposed 
treatment.77  It is the patient’s life and future that is at stake, and the patient 
has a legal right to rely on the physician to disclose information that affects 
their decision to put their life and future in the physician’s hands.  The view 
that informed consent is only required for research and not for treatment can 
only be held by someone who can reasonably be described as “legally 
blind.”  Research and treatment are different.  One recurring difference in 
SUPPORT, for example, is that the use of pulse oximeters set to give 
inaccurate readings can be acceptable in a research protocol, but would be 
malpractice per se in the clinical care setting.  In terms of informed consent, 
the doctrine applies to both, but because the research-subject relationship 
lacks a fiduciary basis, informed consent is more ritualistic and 
procedurally-based in research than in treatment: subjects are required to be 
given and to sign a written consent form, and the consent form itself must be 
approved by an IRB.  On the other hand, SUPPORT researchers are likely 
correct in observing that informed consent in the NICU is more elaborate 
and taken more seriously by researchers than clinicians.  But this is a 
problem with implementing the doctrine of informed consent, and should not 
be used as an excuse to abandon it. 
From the legal perspective, there is not much new in the SUPPORT 
discussion.  All of the issues raised by the SUPPORT study, and the 
reactions to it, were the subject of litigation more than 30 years ago, 
litigation which itself was based on events that transpired in 1953.  As 
summarized by a New York appeals court, the facts of the case are 
straightforward.78  The plaintiff, Daniel Burton, was born six weeks 
premature on July 3, 1953, weighing 3 lbs.  He was transferred the next day 
	  
consent process is subjected to review by IRBs.  In application, however, disclosure and 
consent are taken all too lightly in both settings because physicians and physician-
investigators do not consider patients and patient-subjects as equal partners in the 
decision-making process.”); and Alexander M. Capron, The Real Problems is Consent for 
Treatment, Not Consent for Research, 13 AM. J. BIOETHICS 27, 28 (2013) (describing a 
“disjuncture between ethical theory and medical practice” and concluding that we must 
“develop a better descriptive and normative understanding of the role of informed 
consent in standard care today.”).  
 77. Id.; see also President’s Comm’n for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medic. & 
Biomedical & Behavioral Research, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, 2-3 (1982); 
Nat’l Bioethics Advisory Comm’n, ETHICAL POLICY ISSUES IN RESEARCH INVOLVING 
HUMAN PARTICIPANTS (2001); Robert Baker, A Theory of International Bioethics: The 
Negotiable and the Non-Negotiable, 8 KENNEDY INST. OF ETHICS J. 233, 265-66 (1998); 
GEORGE P. SMITH II, LAW AND BIOETHICS: INTERSECTIONS ALONG THE MORTAL COIL 
ch. 7 (2012).  
 78. Burton v. Brooklyn Doctors Hosp., 88 A.D.2d 217 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982). 
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to New York Hospital, which had the city’s only premature nursery care 
center.  At the time, about half of the infants of his size died, and many 
survivors had either brain damage or blindness.  The blindness is caused by 
retrolental fibroplasia (“RLF”), now called retinopathy of prematurity 
(“ROP”), which a “respected minority” of the medical profession believed 
was caused by too much oxygen.  As the court described the physicians’ 
dilemma in 1953: 
The medical profession was confronted with a terrible dilemma—
the antidote to two problems, death and brain damage, appeared to 
be the cause of another, blindness.  One court, commenting on the 
perplexity of the problem, spoke of the anxiety of those physicians 
who “tried to steer their tiny patients between the Scylla of 
blindness and the Charybdis of brain damage.”79 
Just two days before the plaintiff’s birth, a research study on the effects of 
oxygen on blindness (“Cooperative Study of Retrolental Fibroplasia and the 
Use of Oxygen”) was commenced.  The study concluded, in 1956, that 
prolonged use of oxygen was the critical factor in developing blindness, and 
that curtailment of oxygen after 48 hours to clinical need decreased the 
incidence of blindness without increasing the risk of death or brain damage. 
Although the New York Hospital had done its own study that demonstrated 
that prolonged oxygen exposure may be linked to blindness, it joined the 
new Cooperative Study about the time Daniel was admitted.  Daniel’s 
condition on admission was “good” with no abnormalities, other than his 
prematurity.  From the time of his birth, Daniel had been getting four liters 
of oxygen continuously.  His admitting physician, a resident named 
Lawrence Ross, directed that oxygen be continued at its current level, but, 
aware of the relationship between oxygen and blindness, ordered that 
oxygen be “reduced as tolerated.”80 
At trial, Ross testified that this order was “good medical practice and in 
accordance with my judgment.”81  The medical records indicated that the 
oxygen concentration was reduced (from 35% to 30%) in compliance with 
the order, and the baby was doing well.  Two days later, on instruction from 
the chair of the pediatric department (identified by the court as “Dr. 
Levine”), pediatrician Mary Engle, entered Daniel into the Cooperative 
Study.  He was randomized into the 50% or greater oxygen concentration 
arm (one third were placed in this arm, the other two-thirds in lower oxygen 
concentration arms).  Neither Dr. Ross nor the parents were consulted. As a 
result of being in the study, Daniel’s oxygen levels over the next 28 days 
	  
 79. Id. at 218-19 (citing May v. Dafoe, 25 Wash. App. 575, 576 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1980)).  
 80.  Id. at 220.  
 81. Id. 
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went to as high as 82%, which Engle testified was within “routine practice,” 
and consistent with New York Hospital’s manual on the “Management of 
Premature Infants.” 
Daniel’s eyes were examined by specialists on six different occasions 
(three times while he was in the 28 day high oxygen study, and three times 
in the following month), documenting a slow deterioration in vision, 
including bleeding, that ended in his total blindness.  In 1975, Daniel 
brought suit against the hospital, the resident (Ross), and the pediatrician 
(Engle) for medical malpractice and failure to obtain informed consent 
before putting him in an increased oxygen environment.  The jury found the 
hospital and Dr. Engle liable on both counts.  Dr. Ross was absolved from 
liability for negligence, but found liable for failure to obtain informed 
consent. 
The hospital and the two physicians appealed.  Their first defense was that 
their actions were all within the standard of care.  The court decided that the 
trial judge was correct to put the following issues to the jury:  
Whether defendants followed sound medical practice in 1953 in 
permitting plaintiff to be exposed to an increased oxygen 
environment for a prolonged period, even if it was common 
practice at the time, when they were aware of the possibility that 
RLF [blindness] might result.  Ancillary to that question was 
whether, even if defendants exercised proper medical judgment, 
they should have informed plaintiff’s parents of the risks involved, 
and obtained their consent.82 
The appeals court concluded that the jury’s verdict was supported by the 
evidence with regard to Engle and the hospital, but reversed the verdict 
against Ross “who did not order the increase in oxygen, and whose own 
order to reduce oxygen was countermanded.”83  As to Engle, the court ruled 
that her actions could not be characterized as “acceptable medical practice” 
because in making the decision to enroll Daniel in the research, and to 
randomly assign him to the high oxygen arm, she was exercising no medical 
judgment at all, and in fact never even examined Daniel, who had been 
doing well.  “It seems reasonably clear that Dr. Engle’s order to increase the 
oxygen supply was an administrative judgment, based upon a random 
allocation of babies into one of two groups for monitoring as part of the 
Cooperative Study.”84 
There are many similarities between the Burton case and the SUPPORT 
controversy.  The parents in Burton testified that they were asked to sign 
what is now known as a “general” consent form, authorizing “the doctors of 
	  
 82. Id. at 222 (emphasis added). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 223. 
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the New York Hospital to give such treatment and medication to my son 
which in their judgment becomes necessary while he is a patient in New 
York Hospital.”85  The form also contained language waiving all claims to 
prior notification of any treatment, and contained no language about any 
risks. The defendants argued that there was no duty to obtain informed 
consent in New York until 1965, and that in 1953 it was the hospital’s 
practice to have the resident [Dr. Ross in this case] inform a patient’s parents 
of all the risks involved and the options available before any patient was put 
into an experimental study (Dr. Ross had no recollection of so informing the 
parents).86 
The court had little difficulty finding a duty on the part of physicians to 
obtain informed consent to any procedure involving “unwarranted risks.”  In 
the court’s words, “doctors were never free to expose their patients to 
unwarranted risks without first obtaining their consent.”87  Quoting a 1914 
New York case, the court continued: “Every human being of adult years and 
sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own 
body.”88  As to the language of a 1957 case sometimes (incorrectly) 
identified as the first “informed consent” case in the U.S., the court noted 
that the case merely recognized formally a duty that had always existed.89  In 
	  
 85.  Id. at 225. 
 86. Id. at 225.  Of course there were no IRBs in 1953, and an IRB may well have 
prevented Burton’s enrollment in the study.  Nonetheless, a consensus seems to be 
growing that IRBs have become ineffective at protecting research subjects.  As Professor 
George Smith has put it, “In assessing the effectiveness of the nationwide system for 
protecting the rights and welfare of human research subjects, a pervasive sense of crisis is 
found.  Government studies show conclusively that IRBs review far too many protocols 
within an accelerated time frame, lack adequate resources to conduct careful reviews, and 
do not have sufficient levels of expertise within their membership ranks in order to 
complete their evaluations.  The whole review process has been found to be too tilted in 
favor of the researcher and the institutional interests over those of human subject 
protection.”  GEORGE P. SMITH II, DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND THE NEW MEDICINE 115 
(2008). 
 87. Burton v. Brooklyn Doctors Hosp., 88 A.D.2d 217, 225 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982). 
 88. Id. (citing Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 
1914)). 
 89. Burton, 88 A.D.2d at 226 (citing Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. Trustees, 
317 P.2d 170, 154 Cal.App.2d 560 (1957)).  Consent has a long history in the law, 
although the penchant to put adjectives in front of this noun is more recent and includes 
not only informed consent, but other neologisms such as broad consent, deferred consent, 
tiered consent, and implied consent.  The Nuremberg Code itself used the adjectives 
voluntary, competent, informed, and understanding (1947).  See, e.g., George J. Annas, 
Doctors, Patients, and Lawyers—Two Centuries of Health Law, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
445 (2012).  Nor is consent in the research setting a modern invention.  Historian-
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that court’s words, “a physician violates his duty to his patient and subjects 
himself to liability if he withholds any facts which are necessary to form the 
basis of an intelligent consent by the patient to the proposed treatment.”90  
The court concluded that there was such a duty in 1953, and that whether the 
hospital followed its own consent practices in this case was a question of 
fact for the jury.91  The jury’s verdict was affirmed as to both the hospital 
and Engle, and reversed as to the resident.  The amount of the award, 
however, was reduced from $2,887,000 to $1,500,000 [$3,731,000 in 2013 
dollars], the original amount having been found “disproportionate” to 
Daniel’s injuries. 
The Burton case stands for a number of legal principles directly relevant 
to the SUPPORT Study and its consent process.  First, informed consent is a 
legal duty that obligates a physician to disclose major risks of both treatment 
and research.  Second, whether characterized as “standard of care,” 
“common practice,” or “sound medical practice,” the risks of treatment, as 
well as benefits and alternatives, must be disclosed to the patient so that the 
patient can make his or her own decision.  Third, even when there is a broad 
spectrum of possible “standard” or “accepted” oxygen levels, physicians are 
likely to favor one near the center of a normal distribution, and “cannot avail 
themselves of the shield of accepted medical practice when a number of 
studies . . . had already indicated that increased oxygen was both 
unnecessary and dangerous . . .’ a physician should use his best judgment 
and whatever superior knowledge skill and intelligence he has.’”92 
In short, the primary argument against disclosing the risk of death in the 
SUPPORT study, that because all oxygen levels were within someone’s 
“standard of care”  no new risks were introduced to the patient, is explicitly 
rejected by this court.  The difference between research and treatment is also 
spelled out: having care determined by a protocol, rather than by your 
physician’s “best judgment.”  The secondary argument, that physicians have 
no scientific basis for their practices (the reason we need to do research on 
their practices) so they are simply picking treatments at random (making 
	  
philosopher Robert Baker has noted that consent as a prerequisite to experimentation 
“dates to the very first law regulating health professionals in the British colonies, the 
Duke of York’s Law of 1665.”  This law provides that “no person . . . employed as 
chirugeons, midwives, physicians. . .” may engage in experimental surgery or medicine 
“upon or towards the body of any…without the consent of the patient or patients if they 
be mentis compotes, much less contrary to such consent.”  ROBERT BAKER, BEFORE 
BIOETHICS: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN MEDICAL ETHICS FROM THE COLONIAL PERIOD 
TO THE BIOETHICS REVOLUTION 233-34 (2013). 
 90. Burton, 88 A.D.2d at 226 (citing Salgo, 154 Cal.App.2d at 578).  
 91. Burton, 88 A.D.2d at 226.  
 92. Id. at 223 (citing Toth v Cmty. Hosp. at Glen Cove, 239 N.E.2d 368 (N.Y. 
1968)).  
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explicit randomization no more risky) was also soundly rejected.  In the eyes 
of the law and the public (and, we would guess, an  overwhelming number 
of physicians), it is not only the “gold standard” randomized clinical trial 
that can provide evidence for treatment decisions, but also the physician’s 
experience, knowledge, intelligence, and actual examination and care of the 
patient, including modifying treatment based on how the patient reacts to 
it.93  In fact, the entire movement to expand the research enterprise to 
include many more forms of clinical trials than the “gold standard” double-
blind randomized controlled trial is a recognition of the many limitations of 
this methodology as well.94 
D. Consent Near Extremely Premature Delivery 
One issue not directly dealt with by anyone other than the parents who 
testified at the hearing is the practical issue of obtaining voluntary, 
competent, informed and understanding consent from a parent for research 
on her extremely premature baby (not yet born) when that research might 
increase the risk of death for her baby.  This is probably because no one 
wants to suggest that women become incompetent to consent either simply 
by being pregnant, or at, or near, term. Nor would we suggest that. 
Nonetheless, there are issues worth additional exploration raised by the 
	  
 93. For example, it is common for a physician to use a “trial and error” approach, 
telling a patient, “We’ll try this; if it doesn’t work, we’ll try something else.” 
 94. John P.A. Ioannidis, Why Most Published Research Findings Are False 2 PLOS 
MED. 0696-0701 (2005); see also SUPPORT, supra note 5, and Vinay Prasad, Adam 
Cifu & John P.A. Ioannidis, Reversals of Established Medical Practices: Evidence to 
Abandon Ship, 307 JAMA 37 (2012); Leigh Anne Olsen & J. Michael McGinnis, 
REDESIGNING THE CLINICAL EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH PARADIGM: INNOVATION AND 
PRACTICE-BASED APPROACHES (2010);  Paul Basken, Medical Journals Look Beyond 
Industry to Study Their Shortcomings, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUC., (Sept. 13, 2013) 
(Drummond Rennie, deputy editor of JAMA, noted that  the pressure on researchers 
seeking promotions and building careers, as well as from company sponsorship, 
“guarantees that the report of a randomized clinical trial becomes an illusion. . . . It 
shimmers between a serious scientific report and, ‘Now a word from our sponsor.’”).  In 
SUPPORT the goal was to perform a “definitive medical trial” to determine “what is safe 
and effective oxygenation” for extremely premature infants.  Cole et al, supra note 5 at 
1415-16.  There is little, if any, evidence that this goal was reached.  A meta-analysis of 
all five trials (SUPPORT plus the trials in the UK, New Zealand, Canada and Australia), 
will not be available until 2014.  There is some hope that the 5,230 sample size which 
composes all participants will be able to answer the question: Does targeting a lower 
oxygen saturation range in extremely premature infants from birth or soon after, increase 
or decrease the composite outcome of death or major disability in survivors by 4% or 
more?  Lisa Askie et al., NeOProM: Neonatal Oxygenation Prospective Meta-analysis 
Collaboration Study Protocol, 11 BMC PEDIATRICS 6, 9 (2011). 
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SUPPORT study.  For example, a study done of some of the consent 
processes actually used in the SUPPORT study concluded that obtaining 
consent from women at risk of a premature delivery within the 24-28 week 
window of the study “was very inefficient and costly and biased the trial 
enrollment.”95  Other findings included that “only 19% of the mothers who 
were screened delivered infants who were subsequently enrolled in the 
study” (five families had to be screened for every infant enrolled), and 
consent usually took between 30 and 60 minutes to obtain.96  This seemed 
like a long time to the researchers, but strikes us as a very short period of 
time to explain SUPPORT. 
	  
 95. Wade D. Rich, Kathy J. Austen, Marie G. Gantz, Ellen C. Hale, Angelita M. 
Hensman, Nancy S. Newman, & Neil N. Finer, Antenatal Consent in the SUPPORT 
Trial: Challenges, Costs, and Representative Enrollment, 126 PEDIATRICS e215-221, 
e219 (2010).  See Drazen, Solomon & Greene, supra note 27.  See also, Rebecca J. 
Helmreich, Vanora Hundway, Alison Norman, Joyce Ighedosa & Erica Chow, Research 
in Pregnant Women: The Challenges of Informed Consent 11 NURSING FOR WOMEN’S 
HEALTH 578-85, 592 (2007); Mark S. Schreiner, Editorial, 167 JAMA PEDIATRICS 603, 
605 (Jul. 2013); Hubert O. Ballard, Lori A. Shook, Nirmala S. Desai, & K.J.S. Anand, 
Neonatal Research and The Validity of Informed Consent Obtained in the Perinatal 
Period, 24 PERINATAL 409-15 (2004).  It was noted at the hearing that a substantially 
identical study in New Zealand used a far superior consent form: 
Too low oxygen in the blood for long periods may 1) increase the risk the baby 
will not survive or contribute to poor growth; 2) raise blood pressure in the 
lungs and contribute to bronchopulmonary dysplasia; 3) damage the brain cells 
and lead to developmental problems. . . . The aim of this study is to determine, 
within the range of oxygen saturation values currently used in the treatment of 
preterm babies (85-95%), whether targeting the lower end of this range (85-
89%) compared to upper end of this range (91-95%), beginning within 24 hours 
of birth, is safe and effective in reducing serious vision (ROP) and lung (BDP) 
problems without increasing mortality or neurodevelopmental disability,” and 
nonetheless got a better enrollment rate. BOOST-NZ consent form, personal 
communication from Brian Darlow, principal investigator of BOOST-NZ, July 
2005.   
Another aspect of the SUPPORT study that has gotten little attention, but deserves more, 
is the racial composition of the 1,300 infants—approximately 40% of whom were black.  
This underlines the issue of racial disparities in both medicine and society, as it suggests 
that extreme prematurity is more prevalent in the black population than in the white 
population.  This suggests, we think, that at least some of these mothers lacked good 
prenatal care, adequate nutrition, and education compared to the nonblack mothers of 
premature infants.  This is one reason why one of us (George Annas) suggested at the 
August 28 public hearing that “The problem of extreme prematurity will not be solved in 
the Neonatal ICU.” 
 96. Id. at e217.  In the SUPPORT study, only 26.1% of the mothers who gave 
consent ultimately delivered an infant within the study’s gestational age window. 
28 The Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy Vol. XXX:1 
On the other hand, SUPPORT did have a very  high rate of refusals, which 
speaks well of those tasked with obtaining informed consent, and these 
refusals were in a context that did not discuss the potential increase in the 
risk of death from the study.  To obtain 1,316 infants to randomize, 3,546 
infants were assessed for eligibility, of which 2,230 were excluded for some 
reason, including 699 eligible parents from whom consent was not sought, 
344 whose parent or guardian was not available, and 748 who declined to 
have their infants enrolled in the study.  The 748 number is an exceptionally 
large number of consent refusers—more than a third of the combined 
number of those who gave consent with those who refused.97 
Pregnancy and childbirth are unique experiences, and there is no good 
medical analogy.  When a pregnant patient is admitted to the hospital to give 
birth she is focused on the two specific purposes of her visit: treatment that 
	  
 97. Id.  Some of the items from the UAB protocol under “14. Consent Form Process” 
include:  
All attempts will be made to allow parents 24 hours to make a decision. If, 
however, a patient is admitted in active labor or the decision is made by the OB 
to deliver by cesarean section sooner than expected then it is possible that some 
consents will be obtained in less than 24 hours. . . . Once a mother has been 
identified, research personnel will visit her room and explain the study. . . . A 
significant number of the mothers of infants who are born preterm at University 
Hospital are under 19 years of age.  Because this is a low risk study standard 
therapies [sic] we would like to obtain consent from these mothers allowing 
their infants to participate in the study. Because the State of Alabama declares a 
woman who has delivered an infant to be an emancipated minor, this mother, 
regardless of age, is the legally authorized representative. [sic] She or the father 
of the infant (if married) are the only legally authorized persons who may 
consent for the infant.  It is our standard practice to determine the mother’s 
ability to understand the study purpose, procedures, long-term ramifications, 
and he and her baby’s rights. If the research personnel determine that the mother 
and/or father are not capable of understanding the study at his level, they will 
not be asked to participate based on their inability to understand and make an 
informed decision regardless of age or maturity level.  Additionally, it is our 
practice when obtaining consent from minors to attempt to have the legal 
authorized person or representative of the minor (baby’s mother) present during 
the consent process and sign as witness if she/he is available. 
All of this material is in italics and is also underlined.  If you were confused reading it, it 
is likely that the research personnel responsible for obtaining consent were as well.  The 
title of this subsection of the protocol is also a newly-minted phrase that we haven’t seen 
elsewhere that conflates the consent form with the consent process: “Consent Form 
Process.”  Of course, it also underlines the theory of SUPPORT, that it is simply 
comparing “low risk standard therapies,” although the word “study” is inserted before 
“standard” in this part of the protocol. 
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will enable her child to be born healthy, and treatment that will enable her to 
go through labor and delivery safely. Information provided to pregnant 
patients admitted for labor and delivery includes information on many things 
presented in a fairly succinct way.  Typical consent forms, for example, 
describe tests such as blood tests or fetal monitoring, the types of pain relief 
available during labor, what to expect if a cesarean delivery is necessary, 
and rare complications.  Because childbirth is the most common occurrence 
in medicine (with approximately 4 million births a year in the U.S.), there 
are pretty standard responses to most problems childbirth presents, and there 
may be limited options.  In this context, the right to refuse treatment (and of 
course, the right to refuse to enroll one’s child in research) may be the most 
important tool to exercise autonomy that a woman has.  Of course, informed 
consent is not a form; the form is (or at least should be) simply some 
evidence that the information it contains was discussed with the patient, and 
the patient agreed (or refused to agree) to the proposed course of treatment.98 
Pregnancy is also unique in that the pregnant patient may be required to 
consider interventions her care team recommends for her health which could 
negatively impact her fetus.  There are also considerations in the reverse—
circumstances when the fetus’ best care could involve increased risks to the 
mother.  One example is an unplanned cesarean section birth.  Generally, the 
risk the surgery poses to the pregnant patient’s health is outweighed by the 
benefit to the fetus of not delaying the birth.  However, even in this extreme 
situation, the pregnant patient has the right to refuse a cesarean section, a 
right both courts and the American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists strongly support.99  It would, of course, be paradoxical if the 
pregnant patient had fewer rights to information and decision-making 
regarding research on her soon-to-be baby.  Because she is the decision 
maker for herself and her soon-to-be baby, both the law and ethics requires 
that she be provided with all the material information she needs to make 
decisions, including any risks of death she or her infant might have. 
SUPPORT is, of course, not the only research project ever conducted 
where consent is sought from a pregnant woman shortly before birth, as 
Shawn Pratt’s testimony made clear.100  The major barrier to informed 
	  
 98. George Annas, Remarks at the OHRP Public Meeting, supra note 49.  
 99. Id.  One survey of mothers showed guilt as a predominant emotion when the 
baby was born premature, while none of the mothers surveyed who had delivered full 
term but very small babies, expressed guilt. ALBERT R. JONSEN & MICHAEL J. GARLAND,  
ETHICS OF NEWBORN INTENSIVE CARE 58-59 (1976) (citing David M. Kaplan & Edward 
A. Mason, Maternal Reactions to Premature Birth as an Acute Emotional Disorder, 30 
AM. J. OF ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 539-52 (1960)) 
 100. Shawn Pratt, Comments at the OHRP Public Meeting, supra note 49.  The Pratts 
were asked to consent to a number of studies on their daughter, and did agree to many 
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consent in this setting is that the pregnant patient is being asked to absorb 
the possible risks to herself and her baby associated with the proposed 
research, i.e. she is being asked to consent to something in the future without 
being able to know the condition her baby will be in at birth.  Her major 
concern is for the health of her baby—but this may not be knowable until the 
baby is actually born.  And it is the baby she is signing up for research, not 
herself.  In the SUPPORT study, consent was being sought when the 
pregnant patient was being admitted for what would most likely be a pre-
term birth within a specific period of gestational age set by the research 
protocol, but not if the patient was in active labor.101  This caveat is 
important because it suggests that the researchers were attempting to 
approach women whose infants (once born) would be likely to be within the 
research protocols  under circumstances that would allow the pregnant 
patient to absorb enough information to be reasonably informed when 
deciding whether or not to consent to having their soon to be born infant 
involved in a research study. 
Neonatologist April Dworetz has described her own experiences treating 
extremely premature infants and her interactions with the parents of those 
infants – the “surrogate” decision-makers.102 She has underlined the lack of 
counseling and education parents at high risk of having an extremely 
premature infant receive in our medical system. Many parents have no idea 
of the extreme interventions and suffering that a 20-something week old 
infant can undergo simply to keep them alive in a NICU. Although Dr. 
Dworetz was writing about parental consent for treatment (including 
whether or not to resuscitate an extremely premature infant who is not 
	  
that involved mostly an examination of her medical records, or limited blood draws and 
analysis.  Examples of other studies, not directly related to SUPPORT, include: research 
on the relationship between vitamin C and D supplements and hypertensive disorders, 
research on the relationship between antibiotic treatment for pregnant women with 
asymptomatic bacterial vaginosis and preterm delivery, research on the relationship 
between magnesium sulfate and preventing cerebral palsy, and research on the 
relationship between progesterone and preventing preterm birth. U.S. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., Enrolling Pregnant Women: Issues in Clinical Research Forum 
Transcript 13, 72 (Oct. 18, 2010) (quoting Alan E. Guttmacher and Catherine Y. Spong).  
One reason for the large number of studies of premature newborns is the high rater of 
premature births in the US.  The US shares its 12% prematurity rate with Kenya, Turkey, 
Thailand, East Timor and Honduras, and our rate has risen 30 percent since 1981.  
Donald McNeil, U.S. Fares Badly in Early Births in Global Study, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 
2012, at A1, A4. 
 101. NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, PROTOCOL FOR THE NICHD NEONATAL RESEARCH 
NETWORK SUPPORT TRIAL 12-13 (Aug. 28, 2004) (updated Mar. 28, 2005), 
http://www.nih.gov/icd/od/foia/library/Protocol.pdf. 
 102. April Dworetz, End of Life at Birth, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2013, at A17. 
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breathing at birth), a couple of her points are relevant to the research realm 
as well. Both parents should always be involved in the decision-making 
process.103  Parents at high risk of delivering extremely premature infants (or 
infants with severe congenital deficiencies), should receive counseling about 
medical alternatives, as well as about values and attitudes towards life.  
Patients (and research subjects) under similar circumstances have 
historically been labeled “vulnerable,” but we think it is better to 
acknowledge that they are a “complex” population.104  This is because the 
companion to vulnerability is often paternalism, and, as we have said, 
women do not lose their capacity to make decisions for themselves and their 
infants simply because they are pregnant.  On the other hand, the closer a 
woman comes to giving birth, especially of an extremely premature infant, 
the more stress she is likely to be under, and the more time she may need to 
make a treatment or research decision. 
In this regard it would seem that both the consent process and the consent 
form should be, if anything, clearer and more concise regarding risks of 
death and bodily disability (for both the woman and her fetus) than for non-
pregnant patients. The most important thing for a potential research subject 
(or here, the parent of a soon to be research subject) to know is “how this 
research would treat my baby differently than if he or she were simply a 
patient?” The goal must be to treat the parents or soon-to-be parents with 
respect and dignity in this process. Because neither the pregnant woman nor 
her physicians will be able to make a realistic assessment of the health of the 
baby until it is actually born, perhaps the most important aspect of the 
consent process in near delivery is the ability to re-visit it after birth. 
Although we tend to concentrate on obtaining consent itself – and this is 
reasonable – consideration in this context should be given to upholding the 
right to withdraw consent at any time as at least as important as providing it 
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in the first place. That is because the mother is likely to be more informed 
about the study itself after the baby is born, and she can see her child with 
(or without) the experimental intervention, and make a more informed 
decision whether to continue her child in the experiment or not. In this 
regard, we think it would be helpful to pregnant patients asked to consent to 
research on their soon-to-be-born infants for OHRP to require institutions 
and their IRBs to instruct investigators doing studies on premature infants 
that involve risks of death or disability that: 
• Whenever possible, both parents should be included in the   
consent process regarding use of their infant(s) for research. 
• Counseling (independent of information given by the person 
obtaining consent) should be offered to parents, and should 
include information about randomization and its consequences 
(i.e. losing the medical judgment of the treating physician), the 
interventions that their infant could  undergo if the treatment is 
determined by a research protocol, and how these will differ 
from the interventions  their infant will receive if not enrolled in 
the research. 
• Researchers should use an evaluation technique to test 
comprehension, such as a questionnaire. 
• A second discussion should be held after the infant is born 
where the risks of the research study are provided again to the 
parents, and their right to withdraw from the study reiterated.105 
HHS should not use the SUPPORT study controversy to weaken existing 
informed consent regulations, but rather to improve and strengthen them. 
There is no unique research category  called “standard of care research” any 
more than there is a unique research category  of “therapeutic research.”  
The hold should be removed from OHRP’s reasonable compliance action.  
Research is research—it should not be confused or conflated with treatment.  
Potential research subjects need to be told how research differs from 
treatment, that decisions about care will be made by following a protocol 
rather than following their physician’s medical judgment, and that there is 
no obligation to participate in research (although it could  benefit others if 
they do).  SUPPORT informs us that we are not doing a very good job of 
communicating these basic points to potential subjects.  On the other hand, 
there does seem to be general agreement that long and complicated consent 
forms are not just useless, but counterproductive.  They are useless in that 
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they cannot be understood by most prospective research subjects, and 
counterproductive because their length alone can make it appear to potential 
subjects that researchers are providing all the relevant information that they 
have when this may not be true. 
An additional strategy to protect and inform research subjects that HHS 
should adopt  is  a radical simplification of existing consent forms.  We think 
they should be reduced to no more than one page.  Alternatively, a new, one 
page cover sheet could be used with the current consent forms retained as an 
attachment.  This proposal applies Atul Gawande’s “checklist” strategy for 
surgery and childbirth (among other things) to research.106  It would be used 
not only by Institutions and IRBs, but by investigators when discussing 
research to prospective subjects.  The details need to be worked out, but 
something as straightforward as a checklist with the following items could 
focus everyone’s attention on the essentials of informed consent to any 
research project: (1) You are being asked to join a research project (describe 
it); (2) This is how it will affect your care (including that a protocol will be 
followed instead of your physician’s medical judgment); (3) These are the 
potential risks and benefits of joining the study (explain, always include any 
risks of death or disability); (4) You have no obligation to become a research 
subject, and you will be provided with routine clinical care if you decline; 
(5) You can change your mind at any time and leave the study; and (6) A 
name and phone number of someone who can answer questions. 
CONCLUSION 
Jay Katz, the leading authority on informed consent, always stressed the 
differences between research and treatment, and the desire of both the 
research subject and the physician-researcher to transform research into 
treatment for their own comfort.107  He also criticized Ed Pellegrino for 
asserting that “the ethical sensitivity of the investigator remains an integral 
part of the moral equation. . . . [because] [t]he investigator decides how 
much to tell the patient or family, which facts to emphasize, which to 
withhold, and how to present them.”108  Katz thought that Pellegrino’s view 
represented the old paternalism; but this was not Pellegrino’s intent.  Instead, 
as Pellegrino himself put it in “A Response to Jay Katz,” Pellegrino had 
argued throughout his paper “repeatedly that it is because physicians have 
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such power to manipulate the ‘invitation’ to participate that they have an 
awesome moral responsibility to safeguard both autonomy and bodily 
integrity.”109  Pellegrino underlined that his “message was simply this: the 
fact that physicians can manipulate consent confers not the privilege to do so 
but the obligation to avoid doing so.”110 
Katz and Pellegrino are both correct.  Both agree that like all risky 
interventions, whether characterized as treatment or research, neonatal 
interventions require informed consent.  Informed consent requires that the 
proposed procedure be explained, including how it does (or does not) differ 
from standard treatment and whether it poses any risks of death or disability.  
This seems to be a core problem in the entire discussion of the consent 
process in the SUPPORT study: many researchers (and IRBs) seem to 
believe that there is no legal requirement to obtain the patient’s informed 
consent to medical care (“standard of care”), and that the only relevant law 
for research are the federal research regulations.  This view is so mistaken as 
a matter of law (and ethics) that we term it “legal blindness,” in that the 
researchers seem to be blind to both the common law and state statutes on 
consent to medical treatment.  Why this blindness would manifest itself so 
strongly in the NICU is not entirely clear, but it likely has to do with the 
desire to deny death, or at least not to openly acknowledge it. 
We think it is the centrality of death to both neonatology and neonatal 
research that is the elephant in the delivery room (and the NICU) here.  The 
therapeutic illusion is also strong in this context, but in the NICU it is likely 
to be as strong on the physician’s part as on the patient’s part.  The 
American characteristic of denial of death is in overdrive in the delivery 
room as well.  The soon-to-be-mother wants the best for her baby, and the 
last thing she wants to know is that she might be doing something that could 
increase her baby’s risk of death.  The neonatologist likewise wants the best 
for his or her newborn patients—and will do all in his or her power to deny 
that anything neonatology is doing could be harmful to the baby.  Because 
both parents and physician have a strong motivation to deny death, it is, as 
we think Jay Katz would assert, relatively easy for them to suppress the 
discussion of death completely.  The risk of blindness is important in 
SUPPORT, but less important than the risk of death.  Disclosure of risks of 
death is always challenging, but this challenge is not met by avoidance and 
rationalization.111 
This brings us back to the deficient consent form which began the 
SUPPORT dispute, the failure to disclose the risk of death.  The UAB 
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consent form that OHRP criticized disclosed only one risk: The “possible 
risk of skin breakdown at the site of [the pulse oximeter] will be minimized 
by your baby’s nurse moving the oximeter to another arm or leg a couple of 
times a day.”112  This reflects a central point both Jay Katz and his star 
student/colleague Alexander Capron have made.  In a 2006 tribute to Jay 
Katz, Professor Capron wrote that “even when investigators acknowledge an 
obligation to obtain subjects’ informed consent, their aversion to confronting 
what is really at issue can produce some very striking displacement.”113  
Capron recalls an example provided by Katz who had criticized a UCLA 
research project on schizophrenic patients whose medication was withdrawn 
to study whether it was possible to predict a relapse.  Katz recognized the 
importance of the study, but was critical of the investigator’s inability to 
distinguish treatment from research, and refusal to warn the subject of the 
dangers of relapse.  Instead, as Professor Capron described it, “the consent 
form ironically went into exquisite detail about the trivial risks of a needle 
prick to obtain blood sample.”114  This disclosure could have lulled subjects 
into thinking, as Katz had suggested, “that the investigators would disclose 
any other risks in similar detail and with similar candor.”115  Capron 
continues with his own observation, “Having read hundreds of consent 
forms over the years [he is] convinced that investigators often unconsciously 
displace their anxiety over truly worrisome points by paying attention to 
minor risks about which they can offer more reassurance.” Capron 
concludes: “Unfortunately, this practice implicitly makes the process of 
prior IRB review and subject consent seem like much ado about nothing.”116 
Capron could be describing the concentration on the risks of a skin rash 
(rather than the risk of death) in the SUPPORT study.  Later he goes on to 
suggest that in cancer trials at least, physician-researchers may be taking 
advantage of the “therapeutic illusion” cancer patients have that the trial may 
benefit them.  In the SUPPORT study it seems reasonable to conclude that 
the researchers were not trying to exploit their subjects; rather that they were 
in a mutual conspiracy with them to imagine that no real research was being 
conducted, only “standard of care” treatment.  This is a mutual self-
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deception that both parents and physician are more than willing to engage it; 
the parents because they don’t want to acknowledge that anything worse 
than a skin rash could happen to their baby; the physician because he or she 
doesn’t want to acknowledge that the research project could be putting half 
of the randomized extremely premature infants at a higher risk of death.  The 
researchers can thus be described as being blinded in two ways: first by 
imagining that the study was not research at all, but simply treatment (the 
application of “standard of care” medicine), and second, by convincing 
themselves that the law of informed consent does not apply to treatment.  
The radically paternalistic result would be that physicians could not only set 
the “standard of care” for medical interventions—whether research or 
treatment—but also  set the “standard of care” for informed consent for both.  
That quest is, we think, dangerous to the autonomy and dignity of patients 
and should be repulsed not only by patients, research subjects, and the 
public, but by physicians and researchers as well. 
 
